What\u27s in a name? Software, digital products, and the sale of goods by Hayward, Benjamin
	 	
	
 
 
 
Hayward,	Benjamin	2016,	What's	in	a	name?	Software,	digital	products,	and	the	sale	of	goods,	
Sydney	law	review,	vol.	38,	no.	4,	pp.	441‐462. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the published version. 
 
 
©2016,	Sydney	Law	Review	and	Author 
 
Reproduced by Deakin University with the kind permission of the copyright owner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30090231	
 
© 2016 Sydney Law Review and author. 
What’s in a Name?  
Software, Digital Products,  
and the Sale of Goods 
Benjamin Hayward 
Abstract 
This article addresses how the advent of trade in computer software, and now 
digital products, has challenged the application of sales law and consumer law. 
It addresses the law of three jurisdictions: the United Kingdom (‘UK’), 
Australia and New Zealand. Often, applying the ‘goods’ criterion in these 
regimes will be uncontroversial. Nevertheless, modern market conditions have 
created a need to move beyond the existing question of whether software 
constitutes ‘goods’, and instead to ask how a range of different types of digital 
products fit into sales law and consumer law regimes. Many legal systems have 
settled the software-as-goods question. However, software is only one kind of 
commonly traded digital product. This article argues that other types of digital 
products — including apps, firmware, digital music and electronic books — 
should be treated the same way as software by sales law and consumer law 
regimes. Recent developments in UK consumer law are also analysed as an 
innovative model for reform regarding party rights and obligations in the supply 
of digital products. 
I Introduction 
For over 100 years, common law legal systems have applied special legal regimes 
to the sale of goods. The Sale of Goods Act 1893 (UK) set the standard for the 
common law world. In the United Kingdom (‘UK’), the original 1893 Act is now 
consolidated by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK). It was also the basis for 
derivative Sale of Goods Acts now in force in each of the Australian states and 
territories — the Sale of Goods Act 1954 (ACT), the Sale of Goods Act 1923 
(NSW), the Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT), the Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld), the 
Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA), the Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas), the Goods Act 
1958 (Vic) and the Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA) — as well as New Zealand’s 
Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ). This UK, Australian and New Zealand (‘NZ’) 
legislation applies alongside the common law in regulating sales of goods. The 
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legislation addresses particular issues, while the common law has residual 
application.1 
More recently, structural inequalities between consumers and suppliers have 
prompted protective measures for consumer contracts. In the UK, Australia and 
NZ, consumer protection legislation has been enacted, applying to (among other 
things) supplies of goods. In the UK, this legislation is the Consumer Rights Act 
2015 (UK). In Australia, consumer protection legislation was contained in the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), and is now contained in the Australian Consumer 
Law.2 New Zealand’s legislation, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ), was an 
inspiration for the reform of Australia’s law. In addition to having federal 
application, the Australian Consumer Law applies as the law of each Australian 
state and territory through local implementation legislation, 3  ensuring uniform 
Australian consumer protection law. While the regular sales laws of common law 
states are based upon the principle of party autonomy, and operate subject to party 
agreement,4 these consumer protection regimes are mandatory — their protections 
cannot be excluded by contract.5 
Sales law regimes only apply to transactions involving ‘goods’.6 In many 
cases, the identification of goods poses no difficulty. The theoretical idea of 
‘thinghood’ underpinning the law’s understanding of goods7 is intuitive and often 
easy to apply. UK and Australian cases abound where it was so obvious that goods 
were involved, that judgments either do not mention the concept at all, or do not 
analyse it in detail.8 To take one example, the English decision of Lockett v A&M 
Charles Ltd9 involved the sale of restaurant food causing illness, breaching an 
implied warranty that it be fit for human consumption — the reported decision 
does not make any mention of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (UK) at all. 
However, since the 1980s, computer software as a unit of economic 
exchange has challenged traditional legislative models framed in earlier times.10 
																																																								
1 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 62(2); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 4(2); Goods Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 4(2); Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 60(2). 
2 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (‘Australian Consumer Law’). 
3 See, eg, Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) s 28(1); Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 
2012 (Vic) s 8(1). 
4 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 55(1); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 57; Goods Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 61; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 56. See also JW Carter, ‘Party Autonomy and Statutory 
Regulation: Sale of Goods’ (1993) 6(2) Journal of Contract Law 93, 93. 
5 Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) ss 31(1)–(2); Australian Consumer Law s 64(1); Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) s 43(1). 
6 See, eg, Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 2(1), requiring a sale, of goods, involving the passage of 
property, for money consideration. 
7 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) [2016] FCA 196 
(24 March 2016) [128] (‘ACCC v Valve (No 3)’). 
8 See, eg, Niblett Ltd v Confectioners’ Materials Company Ltd [1921] 3 KB 387: tins of condensed 
milk; Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500: a motor car; Metal Roofing and Cladding Pty Ltd v 
Amcor Trading Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 472 (12 November 1999): polyvinyl chloride (‘PVC’) resin to 
be used in the manufacture of PVC pipes; Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd v McBride [1976] 
2 NSWLR 631: a Hereford bull known as Midgeon Supreme. 
9 [1938] 4 All ER 170. 
10 Christopher Kee, ‘Rethinking the Common Law Definition of Goods’ in Andrea Büchler and 
Markus Müller-Chen (eds), Private Law: National — Global — Comparative, Festschrift für 
Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60 Geburtstag (Intersentia, 2011) 925, 925; Trevor Cox, ‘Chaos Versus 
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Software simply could not have been taken into account at the time sales law 
models were developed. 11  Whether or not software constitutes goods for the 
purpose of sales law and consumer law was debated for some time. All three 
jurisdictions addressed in this article have — through case law or legislative 
intervention — settled this debate. Nevertheless, that historical question is now 
part of a larger problem addressed by this article. The real contemporary question 
is not whether software constitutes goods, but whether the much broader class of 
digital products that are now commonly traded are properly the subject of sales law 
and consumer law regimes. Such digital products include apps, firmware, digital 
music and electronic books. Should digital products, as a broader class of products, 
be treated the same way as software? 
Part II of this article explains the practical importance of this taxonomic 
issue. Part III then summarises existing law in the UK, Australia and NZ 
addressing the classification of software. Part IV addresses the key problem 
confronted by this article: namely, that various kinds of digital products commonly 
traded today are not necessarily sufficiently identifiable with software to conclude 
that they would be treated the same way. Part IV argues that a more contemporary 
perspective is required, shifting the focus of modern analysis towards digital 
products as an overall category of products. Finally, Part V assesses the UK’s 
recent legislative intervention — the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) — as an 
excellent model from which both Australian and NZ lawmakers might learn. 
II What’s in a Name? — Not Just Taxonomy for 
Taxonomy’s Sake 
This article is concerned with digital products. Existing literature, case law and 
legislation addresses software — one type of digital product. So, what’s in a name? 
Rather than this issue being an exercise in taxonomy for taxonomy’s sake, our 
understanding of digital products and software vis-à-vis the goods concept has real 
practical importance for the rights of buyers and consumers, and the obligations of 
sellers and suppliers. 
The meaning of the term ‘goods’ depends upon the context in which it is 
used.12 Two brief examples drawn from criminal law and copyright law demonstrate 
the broader significance of classifying digital products in the law. In the criminal 
law context, not dissimilar definitional issues recently arose in the NZ case of Dixon 
v R,13 a prosecution under the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 249(1)(a). 
That provision establishes that it is an offence to ‘directly or indirectly, 
[access] any computer system and thereby, dishonestly or by deception, and 
without claim of right’ obtain ‘any property’. The appellant, who worked for a 
security firm providing services to a bar, accessed the bar’s security system to 
																																																																																																																																
Uniformity: The Divergent Views of Software in the International Community’ [2000] (3) Business 
Law International 359, 359. 
11 Sarah Green and Djakhongir Saidov, ‘Software as Goods’ [2007] (Mar) Journal of Business Law 
161, 162, 178. 
12 The Noordam [No 2] [1920] 1 AC 904, 908–9. 
13 [2016] 1 NZLR 678. 
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obtain digital footage of a well-known patron, which he then attempted to sell to 
the media, before uploading it to YouTube.14 At issue was whether this digital 
footage — spliced into a compilation on the bar’s computers, copied onto a USB 
stick, and then deleted from the bar’s computers15 — was ‘property’ within the 
meaning of the offence.16 Property is defined in the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 2(1) to 
include ‘real and personal property, … money, electricity, and any debt, and any 
thing in action, and any other right or interest’. The NZ Supreme Court referred to 
the classification of software in sales law as ‘one aspect of the broader statutory 
context’, 17  and specifically referred to St Albans City and District Council v 
International Computers Ltd18  (addressed below) as differentiating information 
from the medium on which it is stored.19  The Court held that the conviction 
recorded at trial must stand:20 
[W]e have no doubt that the digital files at issue are property and not simply 
information. In summary, we consider that the digital files can be identified, 
have a value and are capable of being transferred to others. They also have a 
physical presence, albeit one that cannot be detected by means of the 
unaided senses. Whether they are classified as tangible or intangible, the 
digital files are nevertheless property for the purposes of s 249(1)(a).21 
A further example of the significance of properly classifying digital 
products is provided by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and its treatment of 
computer programs. Pursuant to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31(1)(d), 
copyright includes the exclusive right ‘to enter into a commercial rental 
arrangement in respect of the [computer] program’. Further, pursuant to s 196(1) 
of the Act, copyright constitutes personal property. Computer programs are 
literary works for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).22  However, 
digital music — another kind of digital product — is classified very differently. It 
is a musical work that has been reduced to material (in this case, digital) form, 
and also represents a copy of a sound recording. The Australian copyright context 
is, therefore, one particular area of the law where a distinction is drawn between 
software and other kinds of digital products. 
In both examples, the digital matter is considered property. Goods, 
however, are one specific type of property. That digital products constitute 
property does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that digital products are goods. 
Returning now to the core concern of this article — sales law and consumer law — 
whether or not software, and digital products in general, constitute(s) goods affects 
the rights of buyers and consumers, and the obligations of sellers and suppliers. 
In the UK, Australia and NZ, certain rights are conferred upon buyers and 
consumers by operation of sales and consumer law. Whether or not the subject 
																																																								
14 Ibid 684 [1]–[2]. 
15 Ibid 687 [12]. 
16 Ibid 685 [6]. 
17 Ibid 686 [11]. 
18 [1996] 4 All ER 481, 493 (‘St Albans City and District Council’). 
19 Dixon v R [2016] 1 NZLR 678, 689 [19]. 
20 Ibid 698 [53], 703 [72]. 
21 Ibid 690–1 [25]. 
22 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47AB. 
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matter of a transaction constitutes goods is a threshold condition for buyers and 
consumers being automatically granted those rights. For example, sellers and 
suppliers have an obligation to ensure quiet possession,23 unencumbered title24 and 
correspondence with any sample. 25  Another right conferred concerns title in 
general,26 not necessarily relevant where digital products are licensed — a common 
form of distribution.27 Most important in cases involving software and other digital 
products, however, are rights regarding the quality of goods,28 their fitness for 
purpose,29 and their correspondence with description.30 
Applications of these rights to transactions involving ‘regular’ goods are 
readily appreciated — a non-roadworthy car, or machinery lacking a critical 
performance capability, for example. Factual scenarios involving software and 
digital products implicating one or more of these rights can also be easily 
imagined. A computer game might be released into the market in an objectively 
unfinished or otherwise imperfect state — the 2014 release of ‘Assassin’s Creed 
Unity’ was one example where (in the publisher’s own words) ‘the overall quality 
of the game was diminished by bugs and unexpected technical issues’.31 An app 
might be designed for the Android system, but be incompatible with particular 
types of Android devices.32 Or digital music may be acquired that is not at the 
expected standard of recording quality.33 
If digital products are considered goods, buyers and consumers would enjoy 
the automatic protection of these rights, by operation of law. It would still stand to 
																																																								
23 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) ss 12(2)(b), (5); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 17(2); Goods Act 
1958 (Vic) s 17(b); Australian Consumer Law s 52; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 14(b); 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) s 5(1)(c). 
24 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) ss 12(2)(a), (3)–(4); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 17(3); Goods 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 17(c); Australian Consumer Law s 53; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 14(c); 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) s 5(1)(b). 
25 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 15; Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 20; Goods Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 20; Australian Consumer Law s 57; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 17; Consumer Guarantees Act 
1993 (NZ) s 10. 
26 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 12(1); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 17(1); Goods Act 1958 
(Vic) s 17(a); Australian Consumer Law s 51; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 14(a); Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) ss 5(1)(a), (2). 
27 Cf Thomas Lockhart and Richard McKenna, ‘Software License Agreements in Light of the UCC and 
the Convention on the International Sale of Goods’ (1991) 70(7) Michigan Bar Journal 646, 646. 
28 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) ss 14(2)–(2C); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 19(2); Goods Act 
1958 (Vic) s 19(b); Australian Consumer Law s 54; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 16(b); 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) ss 6–7. 
29 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 14(3); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 19(1); Goods Act 1958 
(Vic) s 19(a); Australian Consumer Law s 55; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 16(a); Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) s 8. 
30 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 13; Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 18; Goods Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 18; Australian Consumer Law s 56; Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 15; Consumer Guarantees Act 
1993 (NZ) s 9. 
31 Yannis Mallat, An Update on Assassin’s Creed Unity from Yannis Mallat (26 November 2014) 
Assassin’s Creed – Ubisoft <http://assassinscreed.ubi.com/en-gb/news/news_detail.aspx?c=tcm:154-
186654-16&ct=tcm:148-76770-32>. 
32 See generally Android, Device Compatibility, Android Developers <https://developer.android.com/ 
guide/practices/compatibility.html>. 
33 Cf Yanto Browning, ‘Studio-Quality Digital Music? It’s Only as Good as Your Set-Up’ (17 March 
2014) The Conversation <http://theconversation.com/studio-quality-digital-music-its-only-as-good-
as-your-set-up-24415>. 
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be determined whether (on the facts of a particular case) there is a breach. 
Nevertheless, as a gateway issue, this matter has great significance — it determines 
whether or not the protections apply at all. Thus, writing in the context of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 (UK), Marsoof identifies that ‘[i]t cannot be doubted that one of 
the key features of the SGA is its implied terms’.34 
It is true that goods contracts are not the only contracts enjoying the benefit 
of legislative protections. The common law world has traditionally recognised a 
dichotomy between goods contracts and services contracts. Legislation confers 
rights with respect to services contracts — for example, under the Australian 
Consumer Law’s pt 3-2, div 1, sub-div B. It may be that some contracts involving 
digital products are best characterised as ‘a pure service’ — where software is 
‘deployed to the user, on demand, at the time of use and typically on a subscription 
or “pay-as-you-go” basis’. 35  This ‘software-as-a-service’ market is growing in 
importance,36 reflected in the popularity of music streaming services, referred to in 
Part IV. Nevertheless, even if this is the case, uncertainty as to whether digital 
products are goods or services still matters. Different protections apply to each. In 
the recent decision of ACCC v Valve (No 3), Valve sought to defend proceedings 
brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) 
under the Australian Consumer Law on grounds (among others) that its Steam 
computer gaming platform was a service, rather than goods.37 The ACCC’s claim 
was based on the guarantee of acceptable quality under the Australian Consumer 
Law s 54, applying to goods transactions only. Valve’s submission was ultimately 
unsuccessful,38 though Edelman J did express some difficulty in characterising 
particular parts of the Steam platform as goods or services.39 
In the UK, the dichotomy between goods and services has been broken by the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK), which came into force on 1 October 2015. This 
legislation proceeds on the basis of a third way — treating digital product 
transactions as a sui generis category, with their own specific legislative 
protections.40 The Act’s very first operative section — its s 1(1) application provision 
— explains that its pt 1 consumer protection provisions apply ‘where there is an 
agreement between a trader and a consumer for the trader to supply goods, digital 
content or services, if the agreement is a contract’. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 
(UK) overcomes problems caused by the restrictive goods-and-services-dichotomy 
by recognising digital products as a third category of case — referred to as digital 
content for the purposes of that legislation. Thus, in pt 1 of the Act, ch 2 deals with 
goods, ch 4 addresses services, but ch 3 is a standalone regime addressing consumer 
protections for digital content. 
																																																								
34 Althaf Marsoof, ‘Digital Content and the Definition Dilemma under the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
Will the Consumer Rights Bill 2013 Remedy the Malady?’ (2014) 9(4) Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 285, 286. 
35 Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘A Call for Judicial Activism — Rapid Technological Developments and 
Slow Legal Developments’ (2011) 36(1) Alternative Law Journal 33, 34. 
36 Ibid. 
37 [2016] FCA 196 (24 March 2016) [6]. 
38 Ibid [7], [340]. 
39 Ibid [156]. 
40 Marsoof, above n 34, 288. 
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As explained in Part V, this legislation is a best-practice model for reform. 
Nevertheless, even in the UK, the classification of digital products as goods or 
otherwise still matters. Sui generis protections only apply to consumer 
transactions, and even then consumers are defined as natural persons only. 41 
Outside the consumer context, the taxonomic difficulties encountered under the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) with respect to both software and digital products 
remain relevant.42 
If digital products are not considered goods, and are not afforded sui generis 
protections as under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK), rights enjoyed by buyers 
and consumers may fall to be determined by the common law. On the facts of a 
particular case, the common law might imply protective terms substantively 
equivalent to those in sales law or consumer law regimes. This view was reached 
by Sir Iain Gildewell in obiter dicta in St Albans City and District Council43 — a 
case involving defective computer software acquired by a local council authority, 
causing financial loss. However, it is important to appreciate that the common 
law’s protection is no substitute for the rights conferred by sales law and consumer 
law. The common law has two fundamental limitations. First, while legislative 
protections apply by operation of law, the common law only implies relevant 
contractual terms in fact. The requirements of the common law are ‘strict’, 44 
including that the term be so obvious that it goes without saying,45 a high threshold 
that will not be met in every case. Second, the common law’s protections are 
afforded by implying terms in contracts of sale. This can be compared to consumer 
law — where there need only be a ‘supply’ of goods. Though the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015 (UK) s 1(1) requires that a supply of goods be by contract, under the 
Australian Consumer Law, supply is defined broadly as including ‘supply 
(including re-supply) by way of sale, lease, hire or hire-purchase’.46 
In sum, the classification of digital products as goods or otherwise matters 
because it stands to affect the rights of buyers and consumers, and the obligations 
of sellers and suppliers. An analysis of this issue matters because it is not entirely 
clear that the law’s existing classification of software would extend to digital 
products in general. On the contrary, there are very real reasons to believe that it 
might not, as analysed in Part IV. 
III The State of Play — Software and the Concept of ‘Goods’ 
It was famously remarked by Lord Steyn that ‘[i]n law context is everything’.47 
The classification of software is not the primary concern of this article, being a 
settled question in the three jurisdictions under consideration. However, the issue is 
still an essential contextual element informing this article’s analysis. 
																																																								
41 Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) s 2(3). 
42 Marsoof, above n 34, 290. 
43 [1996] 4 All ER 481, 494. 
44 Ibid. 
45 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266, 282–3. 
46 Australian Consumer Law s 2(1). 
47 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Daly [2001] 2 AC 532, 548 [28]. 
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For the purposes of this Part’s analysis, the position taken in the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 (UK) will be put to one side. In Part A, the common law’s 
classification of software is assessed, while in Part B, the impact of legislative 
interventions in Australia and NZ are considered. 
A Software’s Classification at Common Law 
In the UK, Australia and NZ, the question of whether software constitutes ‘goods’ 
under sales law and consumer law is determined by the common law, subject to 
statutory intervention. Five key cases develop the position that software constitutes 
goods when it is embodied in a physical medium, but not when it is software 
simpliciter; that is, software in and of itself. While these cases were all decided in 
the UK and Australia, they likely reflect the position that would have been taken in 
NZ had the issue arisen prior to the legislative interventions addressed in Part B.48 
Though this Part addresses software’s classification at common law, the 
starting point in all three jurisdictions is their Sale of Goods Acts’ definitions of 
‘goods’. In the UK and in Australia, there is still no specific reference to software 
in these definitions. For this reason, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) and the 
derivative Australian state and territory statutory definitions are a convenient 
starting point. Both define goods on an inclusive basis. The common law then 
applies its definition of goods, where items do not fall within the specifically 
enumerated categories. At common law, goods are understood as choses in 
possession, given that things in action (the common law’s other type of personal 
chattel) are excluded from the statutory definitions. At common law, choses in 
possession are ‘items capable of being the subject of actual possession’.49 That 
goods are tangible and movable items is, therefore, central to the common law’s 
conception of goods — recently described as ‘thinghood’ by Edelman J in the 
Federal Court of Australia.50 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) s 61(1) provides that ‘goods’: 
includes all personal chattels other than things in action and money, and in 
Scotland all corporeal moveables except money; and in particular ‘goods’ 
includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or 
forming part of the land but which are agreed to be severed before sale or 
under the contract of sale; and includes an undivided share in goods ... 
So far as Australia’s statutory definitions are concerned, the Goods Act 
1958 (Vic) is representative, though slight variations exist in the expression of the 
various state and territory definitions.51 The Goods Act 1958 (Vic) s 3(1), similarly 
to the UK Act, defines ‘goods’ by providing that the term ‘includes all chattels 
personal other than things in action and money’ and that ‘[t]he term includes 
																																																								
48 Dixon v R [2016] 1 NZLR 678, 687 [11] n 11. Cf Electricity Supply Association of New Zealand 
Inc v Commerce Commission (1998) 6 NZBLC 102,555. 
49 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (at 6 February 2012) 315 Personal Property,  
‘(A) Introduction — Meaning and Classification of Personal Property’ [315-15]. 
50 ACCC v Valve (No 3) [2016] FCA 196 (24 March 2016) [128]. 
51 See also Sale of Goods Act 1954 (ACT) ss 2 [dictionary]; Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 5(1); 
Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT) s 5(1); Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld) s 3(1); Sale of Goods Act 1895 
(SA) s A2(1); Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas) s 3(1); Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA) s 60(1). 
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emblements and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to 
be severed before sale or under the contract of sale’. 
Given that these statutory definitions do not specifically address software, 
courts apply the common law definition of goods as being personal chattels and, 
specifically, choses in possession. In doing so, they differentiate software 
embodied in a physical medium from software that is not. Only the former 
constitutes goods. Software not sold by way of a physical medium is not goods for 
the purposes of the UK and Australian Sale of Goods Acts. 
There are five cases from which this principle is distilled, and which 
provide interesting factual applications of its distinction. The first of these is Toby 
Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd,52 which involved 
the sale of ‘a computer system, comprising both hardware and software’ as an 
‘aggregate operative system’.53 As the software was bound up in the hardware, 
there was ‘a sale of tangible chattels, a transfer of identifiable physical property’, 
and the transaction was treated by the New South Wales (‘NSW’) Supreme Court 
as a sale of goods.54 As a result, the implied terms contained in the Sale of Goods 
Act 1923 (NSW) and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (as the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) was then known) applied. 
The second case, St Albans City and District Council,55 was a decision of 
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. That case involved a transfer of 
software simpliciter. An employee of the seller attended the buyer’s premises and 
installed software onto the buyer’s hardware from a disk, but then took that disk 
away. The disk — the physical medium — was not transferred as part of the 
transaction. While Nourse and Hirst LJJ decided the case upon general contractual 
principles, Sir Iain Gildewell also considered whether there was a sale of goods, 
and concluded there was not. A distinction was drawn ‘between the program and 
the disk carrying the program’; the disk was goods, but the program in and of itself 
was not.56 Sir Iain Gildewell likened a disk containing software to an instruction 
manual containing information about maintaining and repairing a car — incorrect 
instructions in a manual can render the manual (as goods) defective, as can a 
defective program to a disk.57 However, since the disk was not itself transferred to 
the purchaser, there was no transfer of goods.58 For this reason, the terms implied 
by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) did not apply; though on the facts of the case, 
the Court of Appeal found that an express term of the contract had been breached 
in any event. 
Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd,59 a case of the High Court of 
England and Wales, involved the purchase of a bespoke integrated software system 
along with various items of hardware. Though expressing reservations about the 
																																																								
52 [1983] 2 NSWLR 48 (‘Toby Constructions’). 
53 Ibid 54. 
54 Ibid. 
55 [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
56 Ibid 493. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 984. 
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distinction drawn in St Albans City and District Council,60 the Court’s decision 
ultimately turned on a different prerequisite to the application of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 (UK) — the requirement of a sale, not satisfied given that the software 
was licensed only.61 
Australia’s Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Re Amlink Technologies Pty 
Ltd and Australian Trade Commission 62  also critiqued Sir Iain Gildewell’s 
distinction.63 Nevertheless, the decision was consistent with that distinction64 when 
it found that events management software distributed via CD-ROM65 was goods.66 
Though this case was decided under the Export Market Development Grants Act 
1997 (Cth), and did not concern the application of sales law or consumer law 
regimes, the classification issue was significant for a different reason. That the 
relevant export grant category was goods (rather than intellectual property or 
know-how) affected the conditions attached to the grant.67 Notwithstanding being 
decided outside the sales law context, sales law jurisprudence was referred to in 
resolving the definitional issue.68 
Software downloaded directly from the internet with no physical medium 
involved at all was addressed by the NSW Supreme Court in Gammasonics 
Institute for Medical Research Pty Ltd v Comrad Medical Systems Pty Ltd.69 While 
reservations were again expressed regarding Sir Iain Gildewell’s distinction,70 that 
distinction was held to represent the current state of the law. Though the Court saw 
some ‘merit’ in adopting a ‘technology-neutral’ approach,71 it held that any change 
to the common law’s position required legislative intervention.72 Since software 
simpliciter was held not to constitute goods, the implied terms under the Sale of 
Goods Act 1923 (NSW) could not apply. The five cases surveyed here establish a 
clear theme of tangibility running through the common law’s position. 
B Software following Statutory Intervention 
Legislative intervention of the kind referred to in Gammasonics has occurred in 
NZ, with respect to its sales law and consumer law. The Sale of Goods Amendment 
Act 2003 (NZ) amended the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) to expressly confirm that 
computer software constitutes goods. Under the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 
2(1), para (c) of the definition of ‘goods’ now provides that the term includes, ‘to 
avoid doubt, computer software’. Equivalent amendments were made to NZ’s 
consumer law. The Consumer Guarantees Amendment Act 2003 (NZ) amended the 
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Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) and in that case, goods also include ‘to avoid 
doubt … computer software’.73 
Legislative intervention has also occurred in Australia, with respect to 
consumer law only. Australia’s sales law maintains the common law position 
described in Part A. This legislative intervention was effected by the 2010 reforms 
to Australia’s consumer law, where the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) became the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), containing the Australian Consumer 
Law in its sch 2. Pursuant to the definitions provision in the Australian Consumer 
Law s 2(1), para (e) of the definition of goods now includes ‘computer software’ 
(as well as para (g) including ‘any component part of, or accessory to, goods’). 
Before the 2010 reforms, the equivalent provision in the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) 74  made no mention of software, so adopted the common law 
position. Case law has recognised the Australian Consumer Law s 2(1) definition 
as a departure from the common law.75 For the purposes of Australia’s consumer 
law, software is now treated as goods irrespective of its form.76 Though this change 
is not addressed in the relevant Explanatory Memorandum,77 and even finds no 
mention at all in one of Australia’s key consumer law texts,78 it is apparent that 
NZ’s 2003 reforms were influential. The literature 79  and also the legislative 
history80 concerning the Australian Consumer Law demonstrate that the legislation, 
as a whole, borrowed heavily from the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ). 
Though the UK recognises digital products as a sui generis category under 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK), like Australia, it has not altered the common 
law position on software under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK). The common law 
position, focusing on tangibility, remains relevant for non-consumer transactions in 
the UK. 
The five cases addressed above, statutory interventions in Australia’s 
consumer law, and legislative amendment to both sales and consumer law in NZ, 
identify when software constitutes goods. What, then, does this tell us about digital 
products in general? Is this purported distinction, really, much ado about nothing? 
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IV Digital Products and Goods — A More Contemporary 
Perspective 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the software-as-goods question was important in and of 
itself. Software was an emerging unit of economic exchange, and was quickly 
growing in both commercial and practical importance, with its classification 
involving a novel question. Today, that question is no longer novel. However, its 
settlement in the UK, Australia and NZ does not directly solve the problem 
addressed by this article — the treatment of digital products, as an overall category 
of products, under sales law and consumer law regimes. 
A Software-as-Goods — An Outmoded Analysis 
The focus of existing analysis on software reflects its genesis in the 1980s. At that 
time, the technological environment was significantly different to that faced by 
modern traders in modern economies. Software was often distributed on 5¼ inch 
or 3½ inch floppy disks. Electronic distribution of software was not a common 
means of commercial software distribution. As a broad generalisation, computers 
(often desktop computers) ran operating systems such as MS-DOS, Windows 3.1 
or Mac System. Through those operating systems they ran software — understood 
in this traditional context as ‘computer programs’. Those programs consisted of, 
and may also have made use of, ‘files’. Understanding what constituted software in 
this environment, at this time, was relatively straightforward. Software was a 
traditional computer program that may or may not have made use of other external 
files to achieve particular user results. A word processor would be seen as 
software; individual document files created pursuant to that software would not. 
Similarly, a mathematical program may generate random numbers — though not 
operating by reference to external files, this kind of computer program would also 
be understood as software. 
This traditional understanding of software is reflected in the 1983 decision of 
Toby Constructions. In that case, Rogers J of the NSW Supreme Court explained: 
A computer is a device designed to accept data, manipulate or process it in 
accordance with instructions, being the programmes, and generate a useful 
output. Both input and output need physical devices such as readers, teletype 
printers, video display tubes and discs. The heart of the computer is the 
central processing unit which performs the actual processing. All these items 
are tangible physical objects. By itself hardware can do nothing. The really 
important part of the system is the software. Programmes are the instructions 
or commands that tell the hardware what to do.81 
The problem with existing software-as-goods analyses is that their frame of 
reference is stuck in the technological and economic environment of the 1980s, which 
no longer reflects modern trading conditions. There are some isolated examples in the 
academic literature taking a broader approach.82 However, analysis of software has 
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‘significantly dominated’ existing thought.83 Most literature addressing software and 
the concept of goods equates software with traditional computer programs, 84  as 
Rogers J did in 1983. While some analysis has assumed the equivalence of software 
and digital products,85 it is not clear that this assumption is valid. 
A recent Australian authority — ACCC v Valve (No 3)86 — illustrates the 
risk identified here; namely, that digital products and software may not necessarily 
be understood as equivalents. In that case, the ACCC alleged that Valve (operator 
of the Steam computer gaming platform) engaged in misleading or deceptive 
conduct contrary to the Australian Consumer Law s 18(1), and made a false or 
misleading representation under the Australian Consumer Law s 29(1)(m), by a 
series of no-refund representations.87  The issues addressed in this article were 
implicated as it was alleged that the no-refund representations were contrary to the 
non-excludable 88  consumer guarantee of acceptable quality in the Australian 
Consumer Law s 54, which applies only to supplies of goods.89 
The Federal Court of Australia held that through the Steam platform, Valve 
did engage in the supply of goods — being computer games. 90  However, in 
reaching that conclusion, Edelman J made the following observations about the 
term ‘computer software’, as it appears in the definition of goods contained in the 
Australian Consumer Law s 2(1): 
Mr Dunkle’s evidence, which I accept, was that computer software is 
instructions or programs that make hardware work. The video games 
provided by Steam required computer software to make them work. The 
material downloaded by consumers included non-executable data such as 
music and html images. Mr Dunkle’s uncontested evidence on this point was 
that this non-executable data was not computer software. But he accepted 
that the computer software made that non-executable data work … As Mr 
Dunkle said, the games consist of software and a number of other assets (eg 
music, images).91 
I do not accept the ACCC’s primary submission that everything that was 
supplied by Valve … was a supply of a good. As I have explained, some 
matters provided were not goods. For instance, the non-executable data 
which accompanied, and was incidental to, the computer software was not a 
good although it is hard to see how it could be decoupled from the computer 
software.92 
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On this view, only executable data constitutes software, and falls within the 
statutorily expanded definition of goods. However, alongside software, a variety of 
other digital products are now commonly traded and are now also economically 
important. While it is clear in the UK, Australia and NZ when software will and 
will not constitute goods, what is not clear is whether other types of digital 
products would be treated the same way. The various types of digital products do 
not form a closed list — the concept itself is hard to define.93 Apps, firmware, 
digital music and electronic books are four examples of commonly traded digital 
products whose classification is not clear, on the law’s current state. 
This article argues that these digital products are sufficiently distinct from 
software to make it not at all obvious that they would be classified the same way. 
Nevertheless, this article argues that they should be. To properly advance a resolution 
of this issue, a more contemporary perspective on existing software-as-goods 
analysis is needed. The frame of reference should be shifted away from (only) 
software, and towards digital products as an overall category of tradeable items. 
B Apps as Digital Products 
Of these other kinds of digital products, the one most closely resembling software 
(as traditionally understood) is the app. It might be thought that apps would be 
identified as software, given that an application is technically defined as the 
software used for a particular role or a particular task that a device performs.94 In 
accordance with the analysis in ACCC v Valve (No 3), an app may be characterised 
as executable data, and therefore software. 95  Nevertheless, there is still the 
potential for perceived differences between apps and traditional computer 
software. Apps are distributed through particular online platforms that differ from 
the distribution channels traditionally used for computer programs. The Apple App 
Store, Google Play and the Windows Store are well-known examples. Apps might 
therefore be seen to occupy a distinct market position. Over 100 billion downloads 
have been reported from the Apple App Store alone.96 These downloads have 
resulted in more than US$30 billion being paid to app developers.97 The possibility 
for the perception of differences between apps and computer programs is also 
evidenced by some products being separately distributed in both forms. For 
example, Microsoft’s Surface tablet was (in its first generation) manufactured in 
both ‘RT’ and ‘Pro’ versions. The Surface RT would only run apps from the 
Windows Store, while the Surface Pro was capable of running both Windows Store 
apps as well as full desktop programs. Microsoft Office 2013 was distributed as an 
app version for the Surface RT, but as a full desktop program for the Surface Pro 
and other personal computer platforms. While, on the one hand, this is the natural 
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consequence of different hardware models running different operating systems, it 
reinforces that apps and traditional computer programs may be understood as 
different, at least from a commercial perspective. 
C Firmware as Digital Products 
Firmware has some similarities to software, being defined as system software held 
in read-only memory.98 Even though an operating system in itself might fit the 
description of a traditional computer program set out in Toby Constructions, and 
would constitute executable data as discussed in ACCC v Valve (No 3), other 
firmware and operating system updates might not. Further, system software itself 
might be thought of as qualitatively different to the kind of software described by 
Rogers J in Toby Constructions. It is not obvious that the conception of software 
which has been the subject of existing analysis would include either apps or 
firmware. 
D Apps and Firmware — Policy and Classification 
When distributed through platforms such as the Apple App Store, Google Play or 
the Windows Store, apps and firmware are, by definition, distributed electronically 
rather than via physical media. Thus, for both, being clear about the definition of 
goods vis-à-vis digital products is important. Policy considerations support both 
apps and firmware being given the same treatment as software in existing 
software-as-goods analysis. This is because both apps and firmware fulfil the same 
functional purposes as traditional programs. It is therefore important to be clear 
that apps and firmware should be treated at law the same way that software 
currently is — whether or not particular sales law or consumer law regimes 
recognise software as goods. While it is not beyond doubt that common law courts 
would hold otherwise, clarity is desirable. It is a commonly held belief that the law 
perpetually plays catch-up with technology,99 and published examples of judges’ 
unfamiliarity with even common technologies are apt to reinforce perceptions of 
this kind.100 
E Digital Music and Electronic Books as Digital Products 
Still other digital products have a much less obvious analogy with software as 
traditionally understood. Two examples assessed here are digital music and 
electronic books. Neither constitutes executable data — with music files 
accompanying computer games being specifically identified as not constituting 
software by Edelman J in ACCC v Valve (No 3).101 Recasting existing analysis 
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away from software and towards digital products in general is even more important 
in these cases. For these digital products, policy considerations also support their 
receiving the same treatment as software. From early and notorious beginnings, 
where both were typically distributed through peer-to-peer file sharing networks 
(largely in infringement of intellectual property rights), both have become big 
(legitimate) industries, and important units of economic exchange. 
F Tax Law — A Policy Exemplar 
Shifting the focus of analysis to the overall category of digital products might also 
promote coherence with developments in other areas of the law. Australia’s tax law 
— specifically, the goods and services tax (‘GST’) — provides an interesting 
policy exemplar addressing digital products as an overall category of products. 
The Australian Government, in its 2015 budget, signalled its intention to 
apply the GST to imported digital products (in addition to those domestically 
supplied) from 1 July 2017.102 The GST is levied through the A New Tax System 
(Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (‘GST Act’). Following this budget 
announcement, the Australian Government released two versions of an exposure 
draft bill,103 before the Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2016 Measures 
No 1) Bill 2016 (Cth) was passed by both houses of Federal Parliament on 4 May 
2016, receiving Royal Assent the following day. 
The law, as far as possible, should speak a language appropriate to modern 
technological conditions. As the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Tax 
and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2016 Measures No 1) Bill 2016 (Cth) 
pointed out, there have been ‘significant changes in Australia and the world’ in the 
15 years since the GST’s introduction.104 While, at that time, cross-border intangible 
supplies ‘were relatively unusual, especially for consumers’, today they ‘form a 
large and growing part of Australian consumption’. 105  Domestically distributed 
digital products have always been subject to GST, though under the GST Act in its 
original form, imported digital products have not. The Tax and Superannuation 
Laws Amendment (2016 Measures No 1) Act 2016 (Cth) changes this so that all 
digital products, regardless of their origin, will become subject to GST. Given this 
vision for Australia’s GST to capture digital products as a category of products, 
precedent does exist for the kind of mindset change urged by this article with 
respect to sales law and consumer law regimes. 
This coherence might ultimately only be achieved in substance, if not in 
form. Interestingly, this law reform does not involve broadening the GST’s 
definition of goods. The GST Act s 195-1 defines ‘goods’ (an exhaustive 
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definition) as ‘any form of tangible personal property’, and the Tax and 
Superannuation Laws Amendment (2016 Measures No 1) Act 2016 (Cth) makes no 
change to this definition. Domestically supplied digital products are taxed on the 
basis that they are supplies of ‘anything other than goods or real property’ under 
the GST Act s 9-25(5). The 2016 amendments secure the taxable status of imported 
digital products by adding a new limb to the existing list of taxable supplies of 
‘anything other than goods or real property’.106 As a matter of form, these changes 
to Australia’s GST regime will therefore result in the offshore supply of digital 
products being taxed specifically because they are not goods for the purposes of 
GST law. As a matter of substance, however, the measure secures the taxable 
status of all digital products — software and otherwise — regardless of origin. As 
summarised by the Explanatory Memorandum, ‘[t]his change results in supplies of 
digital products, such as streaming or downloading of movies, music, apps, games 
and e-books … receiving similar GST treatment whether they are supplied by a 
local or foreign supplier’.107 
G Digital Music and Electronic Books — Policy and Classification 
Digital music and electronic books are two examples of digital products which do 
not have a strong analogy with software, as traditionally understood. Digital music 
and electronic books are both more akin to the external files that these programs 
made use of — or, adopting the perspective taken in ACCC v Valve (No 3), 
non-executable data. Though the NZ Supreme Court in Dixon v R was of the view 
that ‘valuable digital files’ can constitute property, 108  and that there was no 
distinction between data files and software in this respect,109 goods are only one 
kind of property. The conclusion that digital music and electronic books would be 
treated the same way as software, in applying the definition of goods, does not 
necessarily follow. Nevertheless, policy factors support the treatment of digital 
music and electronic books in the same way as software. This is because both 
relate to their historical corporeal equivalents in the same way that software 
simpliciter does. As explained by Marsoof, ‘[b]ut for the lack of tangibility, the 
nature of transactions relating to the sale of digital content is in every sense 
identical to transactions concerning physical goods’.110 
Software simpliciter has a tangible and movable equivalent — software 
distributed through physical media. Similarly, digital music and electronic books 
have tangible and movable equivalents — including compact discs, vinyl records 
and tapes for the former, and hardback books, softcover books, print newspapers 
and print magazines for the latter. Software housed in a tangible medium is clearly 
goods, as are tangible music products and print books.111 It would therefore make 
logical sense for digital music and electronic books to receive the same treatment 
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under sales law and consumer law as software simpliciter, whether that involves 
treating those digital products as goods or not. 
Further, all types of digital products under discussion here are important to 
the modern economy. For example, the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry reported that in 2014, digital music distribution reached 
parity with physical format sales for the first time, each representing 46% of global 
industry revenue.112 By way of further example, 2013 saw a particularly auspicious 
milestone reached, with the iTunes store marking its 25 billionth song download.113 
While these considerations do not speak to legal classification per se, they do 
underscore the importance of clarity. Since digital music and electronic books 
would not clearly be identified as programs, they do not fit neatly into the existing 
analysis of software as goods (or otherwise). Recasting the focus of that analysis 
around digital products would ensure that they do. 
H Streaming Services — A Counter-Example 
These kinds of digital products, however, must be contrasted with increasingly 
popular music streaming services114 such as Pandora, Spotify, iTunes Radio and 
Apple Music. Treating digital music the same way as software for the purpose of 
defining goods under sales law regimes will not lead to the (inappropriate) 
application of those regimes to music streaming services. Streaming is a different 
means of accessing digital content as compared to downloading.115 Even if a legal 
system does treat software as goods, and (according to this article’s argument) goes 
on to more broadly treat digital products as goods too, it is in the nature of music 
streaming services that they do not involve a sale.116 Without a sale, there can be 
no application of the UK, Australian or NZ Sale of Goods Acts.117 These platforms 
may still be governed by legislation addressing the supply of services — as 
outlined in Part II, it is not the case that every transaction involving digital 
products must be classified on the basis of a binary choice between goods and non-
goods (and not anything else at all). 
As against this analysis, however, it is interesting to note that the consumer 
protection regimes contained in the Australian Consumer Law and the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) require only that there be a supply of goods, rather than 
a sale.118 The concept of supply is broader — defined (on an inclusive basis) by 
																																																								
112 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, IFPI Digital Music Report 2015, 6 
<http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2015.pdf>. 
113 Apple (Australia), ‘iTunes Store Sets New Record with 25 Billion Songs Sold’ (Press Release,  
6 February 2013) <https://www.apple.com/au/pr/library/2013/02/06iTunes-Store-Sets-New-Record-
with-25-Billion-Songs-Sold.html>. 
114 Lexy Savvides and Nic Healey, Australian Music-Streaming Services Compared (26 November 
2015) CNET <http://www.cnet.com/au/news/australian-music-streaming-services-compared/>. 
115 Martins de Castro, Reed and de Queiroz, above n 93, 104. 
116 Cf Corones and Clarke, above n 79, 462 [11.25]; Svantesson, ‘A Call for Judicial Activism’, above 
n 35, 34–5. 
117 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) ss 1(1), 2(1); Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) s 6(1); Goods Act 1958 
(Vic) s 6(1); Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) s 3(1). 
118 See, eg, Australian Consumer Law s 54(1)(a); Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) s 6(1) — both 
with respect to the consumer guarantee of acceptable quality. 
2016] SOFTWARE, DIGITAL PRODUCTS, AND THE SALE OF GOODS 459 
reference to sales, as well as exchanges, leases, hire, and hire-purchase 
arrangements,119 although the Federal Court of Australia in ACCC v Valve (No 3) 
suggested that assessing whether there is a supply of goods should be treated as 
one question, rather than two.120 Nevertheless, in Goldiwood, the Queensland Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal applied Australia’s consumer guarantees regime to 
web-based software.121 As explained by the Tribunal, this kind of supply might not 
only involve an absence of physical media, but ‘it could well be that no software is 
downloaded onto the purchaser’s device at all’.122 
I Interim Conclusion 
Whether or not sales law and consumer law regimes treat software as goods, 
this Part’s analysis supports apps, firmware, digital music and electronic books 
being treated the same way as software. These four types of digital products might 
not be identified as programs in the traditional sense, supporting the argument that 
digital products as an overall category of products should now be the focus of 
ongoing analysis. Maintaining the present focus on software only risks excluding, 
by implication, these other types of digital products from its scope. Whether or not 
digital products constitute goods for the purposes of sales law and consumer law 
regimes stands to meaningfully affect the rights of buyers and consumers, and the 
obligations of sellers and suppliers. So far as legislative intervention has occurred 
in the Australian and NZ contexts, such intervention does not solve the issues 
addressed in this Part. That intervention still only focuses on software. 
V A Break from Tradition — UK Consumer Law as an 
Innovation and a Model for Reform 
On the other hand, recent legislative intervention in the UK represents a break 
from this tradition. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK), introduced in Part II 
above, represents an opportunity for Australian and NZ lawmakers to learn, and 
represents an innovative model for reform. The Act came into force on 1 October 
2015 and does not simply recognise software as constituting goods.123 Instead,  
it breaks the traditional dichotomy of goods and services and recognises digital 
products — termed digital content under the Act — as a third category of 
consumer contract attracting the benefit of its consumer protection provisions.124 
The term ‘digital content’ is defined in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) 
s 2(9) as ‘data which are produced and supplied in digital form’. Through this 
definition, the Act does not limit its application to software, and unambiguously 
captures the four kinds of digital product addressed in this article. Thus, the 
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Explanatory Notes to the Act point out that ‘[d]igital content may be supplied on a 
tangible medium … for example a DVD or software, on a computer or not, for 
example an e-book or music download’;125 and they go on to note that digital 
content ‘includes software, music, computer games and applications or “apps”’.126 
One of the difficulties encountered with respect to existing software-as-
goods analysis has been identifying how software simpliciter fits into the existing 
goods and services dichotomy.127 While recognising a third category of contract 
under consumer law may not be necessary or even desirable if digital products can 
be effectively accommodated within these traditional categories, 128  given the 
limitations of the common law position analysed in Part III, this framework 
represents an important development in UK consumer law.129 Even so, as explained 
in Part II above, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) does not completely solve the 
taxonomic issue addressed by this article. Outside of its consumer context, 
difficulties persist under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK). 
Nevertheless, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) is significant for three 
reasons. First, it is an example of a legal regime embodying the kind of modern 
technological and economic thinking advocated by this article. Rather than adopting 
the half-way solution taken in Australia and NZ, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
(UK) directly tackles the broader issue of digital products. Second, it represents a 
legal regime from which both Australia and NZ can learn; a regime that is 
innovative and might serve as a model for the reform of our own domestic regimes. 
The protections offered by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) are already familiar 
to Australian law130 — including that goods be of satisfactory quality,131 that they 
be fit for a particular purpose,132 and that they be as described.133 By recognising 
digital products as a third type of consumer contract, these same protections are 
extended to digital products134 in a way that is entirely compatible with existing 
Australian and NZ consumer protection regimes. 
However, third and most importantly, the very existence of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 (UK) pt 1 ch 3 (‘[d]igital content’) is recognition of the fact that in 
modern technological and economic conditions, it is not enough to clarify only the 
classification of software. The Act’s Explanatory Notes identify (in rationalising its 
approach) that ‘it was not clear what, if any, legal rights the consumer has if digital 
content proves defective or fails to live up to the consumer’s expectations’, as ‘it is 
not clear whether digital content would be described as goods, services, or something 
																																																								
125 Explanatory Notes, Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) 16 [39]. 
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else’.135 This conclusion was reached on the basis of a report commissioned by the 
UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills,136 describing ‘much of the legal 
analysis in the decided cases’ as ‘thin’.137 This identified risk was borne out in ACCC 
v Valve (No 3), and its differentiation of executable from non-executable data. 
For the purposes of UK consumer law, we can therefore see a clear 
solution to the problem identified in Part II of this article. In the UK, the supply 
of digital products (and not just software) to consumers will attract the kinds of 
statutory protections that have traditionally been afforded to goods. The 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) makes clear that, in the case of digital products, 
these rights (and obligations) automatically apply, and that resort to the common 
law rules for implying terms in fact (which will not be satisfied in every single 
case) is not necessary. 
VI Conclusion 
Special legal regimes dealing with sales of goods have existed in common law 
legal systems for over 100 years. More recently, consumer law has introduced non-
excludable protections for consumer transactions concerning goods (and also 
services). Contracts falling within these regimes are subject to rules tailored to 
those contexts. In particular, they automatically imply certain terms and 
protections into goods transactions that are not automatically implied under the 
common law of contract. Where digital products are at issue, the way in which 
they fit (or do not fit) into these regimes will affect the rights of buyers and 
consumers, and the obligations of sellers and suppliers. 
UK, Australian and NZ law have each reached a settled view as to whether 
software constitutes goods. However, these solutions do not address a more 
important question in today’s technological and economic environment — are 
digital products, as a broader category of products, goods for the purposes of sales 
law and consumer law? It is not at all clear that four types of commonly traded 
digital products — apps, firmware, digital music and electronic books — are 
sufficiently identifiable with software to conclude with certainty that they would be 
treated the same way at common law and under statute in these countries. 
This article argues that existing software-as-goods analysis should be recast 
around the broader concept of digital products. This would ensure that it does not 
exclude other digital products from its scope, by implication. This article also 
argues that the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) constitutes an innovative model 
for Australian and NZ law reform. That Act has moved beyond the traditional 
goods and services dichotomy and recognises digital products as a third category 
of case warranting consumer protection. Its very existence evidences the problem 
with which this article is concerned. 
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In this sense, this article’s analysis might be thought of as a tale of three 
jurisdictions. Software’s character as goods (or otherwise) is settled in all three, but 
only the consumer law of one (the UK) has effectively dealt with the rise of digital 
products. 
Debate over software’s classification made contextual sense in the 
technological and economic environment of the 1980s and 1990s. Today, however, 
software is just one of several kinds of digital products that are common and 
important units of economic exchange. What’s in a name? As this article has 
demonstrated, quite a lot. Technology and the economy have moved past the point 
where a focus on software alone can be justified. Ensuring that digital products as 
an overall category of products are the focus of continued analysis will best reflect 
the market of today. 
